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Auction rate securities are an example of a relatively obscure financial market instrument 
that has been caught up in the recent negative sentiment affecting the financial markets. 
This article examines these securities and sheds some light on recent events.
Until recently, the market for auction 
rate securities (ARSs) was a thriving, if 
little-known, segment of the capital mar-
kets. Auction rate securities are long-term 
securities, but with time-varying interest 
rates that are reset periodically via an 
auction process. As U.S. ﬁ  nancial markets 
have struggled to absorb the problems 
of subprime mortgages and tightened 
credit conditions, the ARS market has 
attracted a good deal of negative atten-
tion. Auctions to reset the rates of these 
instruments repeatedly failed, resulting 
in numerous lawsuits in which ARS in-
vestors claimed that the nature of the 
risks of these securities had been mis-
represented.1 The U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and several 
state attorneys general have also initiated 
investigations of several major under-
writers of ARSs. These developments are 
but one example of a relatively obscure 
portion of the capital markets falling 
victim to the recent credit crisis. 
In this article, we describe these securities 
and the market in which they operate. 
We then examine the collapse of this 
market, starting in February of 2008, and 
the aftereffects that are still being felt. 
What are auction rate securities?
The ARS market started in 1984 as an 
alternative to long-maturity debt for en-
tities needing long-term funding. The 
market for these securities expanded 
signiﬁ  cantly during the current decade 
and was estimated to have reached about 
$330 billion in 2007. The idea behind 
an ARS is to create a funding instrument 
that behaves like a long-term bond for 
the issuer but resembles a short-term 
security, such as commercial paper, for 
the investor. Speciﬁ  cally, ARSs are long-
term securities (typically 20 years or 
longer), but with interest rates that are 
reset at ﬁ  xed intervals through a so-called 
Dutch auction, which we describe later. 
These interest rate resets are typically 
done at intervals of one, four, ﬁ  ve, or 
seven weeks, although other reset inter-
vals are possible. When functioning as 
designed, these periodic auctions give 
the bonds a degree of liquidity compa-
rable to very short-term assets. Because 
of the frequent interest rate resets, ARSs 
normally trade at close to par value (the 
face value or issue price of the bond). 
Often, an ARS includes a provision that 
allows the issuer to convert the ARS to 
a more conventional long-term security, 
such as a ﬁ  xed-rate bond. 
Historically, ARSs have usually been 
issued by municipalities, student loan 
ﬁ  nance authorities, and other tax-exempt 
entities. Prior to the recent ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil, most municipal ARSs earned 
high credit ratings from the rating 
agencies, often beneﬁ  ting from credit 
enhancement in the form of insurance. 
Another important class of ARS issuers 
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Auction rate securities are 
long-term securities, but with 
time-varying interest rates that 
are reset periodically at ﬁ  xed 
intervals via an auction process.is closed-end mutual funds. These mutual 
funds use auction rate debt as a way of 
enhancing returns via leveraging. 
The auction process 
The interest rate on ARSs is reset through 
an auction process. In this auction, secu-
rities are supplied to the auction by exist-
ing holders of the ARS issue who wish 
to sell. Potential purchasers (including 
existing holders who wish to reinvest) 
bid for securities by specifying both the 
quantity of securities they wish to buy 
and the minimum interest rate they will 
accept. The lowest rate that clears the 
market is called the “clearing rate.” The 
entire supply of securities is allocated 
to those bidders who speciﬁ  ed a mini-
mum acceptable interest rate at or below 
this clearing rate. (If the total number 
of bids at or below the clearing rate ex-
ceeds the quantity of securities offered for 
sale, the bids at the clearing rate are allo-
cated on a prorated basis.) These investors 
all receive the clearing rate, regardless 
of the speciﬁ  c rate they bid. No securities 
are allocated to bidders who speciﬁ  ed 
a minimum rate above the clearing rate. 
If the auction process works correctly, 
it gives ARSs a high degree of liquidity 
for investors, since the investors can 
choose to redeem their ARS holdings 
at par at the next scheduled auction.
While ARSs are clearly long-term bonds, 
these periodic auctions allowed holders 
to treat them as short-
term securities. As 
described in a news-
letter from August 
2004 published by 
the State of California, 
“[Auction rate securi-
ties] are priced and 
traded as short term 
instruments because of 
the liquidity provided 
through the interest 
rate reset mecha-
nism.”2 Indeed, the 
investors (typically 
high-net-worth indi-
viduals and corporate 
treasurers) viewed 
these instruments 
mainly as a vehicle to 
park short-term cash. 
One of the keys to the growth of this mar-
ket was the belief on the part of investors 
that these instruments were the equiv-
alent of a money market fund. In the 
earlier years of this market, most buyers 
classiﬁ  ed ARSs for accounting purposes 
as cash equivalents. Starting in 2005, 
the Big Four accounting ﬁ  rms3 required 
their clients to reclassify ARSs as short-
term, and, in a few cases, long-term hold-
ings per FAS (Financial Accounting 
Standard) 95.4 However, many ﬁ  nancial 
service ﬁ  rms continued to show ARSs 
on client statements as cash equivalents, 
in violation of FAS 95.
Failed auctions
An auction fails when there are insufﬁ  -
cient bidders to cover the number of 
securities offered for sale. In this case, 
the securities are priced at a penalty rate 
as speciﬁ  ed in the prospectus. The pen-
alty rate typically equals the state usury 
maximum or a certain spread over a 
reference rate (generally the London 
interbank offered rate, or Libor). Failed 
auctions result in the investors’ not being 
able to redeem their money and the 
issuer paying a higher rate. 
Before the recent turmoil, auctions for 
ARSs rarely failed. In part, this was 
because the banks that specialized in 
running auctions would step in with their 
capital to prevent failures when bidding 
faltered. Starting in fall 2007, there were 
anecdotal reports that these banks—as 
they suffered signiﬁ  cant credit losses and 
mortgage write-downs stemming from 
the subprime mortgage collapse—were 
less willing to commit their money to 
supporting auctions in danger of failing. 
By February 2008, fears of auction fail-
ure became self-fulﬁ  lling as potential 
investors withdrew from the ARS market. 
The resulting widespread auction failures 
signiﬁ  cantly increased borrowing costs 
for many municipalities and corporate 
entities. For example, following a failed 
auction on February 12, 2008, the inter-
est rate on the New York Port Authority’s 
ARS issues jumped up to 20% from 4.3%.5 
Although that rate subsequently came 
back down to 8%, it remained signiﬁ  cantly 
higher than it was before the market 
turmoil. Similarly, rates on auction rate 
debt of University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center topped 17% the week ending 
February 15, 2008, following a failed 
auction. During this period the ARS 
market displayed chaotic behavior, with 
signiﬁ  cantly different rates produced 
for virtually identical ARSs. For example, 
the East Bay Municipal Utility District in 
California issued two ARSs with virtually 
identical terms, except for the original 
underwriter—one was underwritten by 
Merrill Lynch, the other by Citigroup. 
On February 19, 2008, the reset auction 
for the Merrill Lynch issue produced a 
clearing rate of 7.98%, while that for 
the Citigroup issue produced a clearing 
rate of 5%. (The previous week’s auctions 
for the same securities had produced 
interest rates of 4.25% for the Merrill 
issue versus 7% for the Citigroup issue.)6
These examples of higher ARS rates 
due to failed auctions illustrate a more 
general pattern: The average spread 
between the one-month ARS rate and the 
one-month Libor has increased mark-
edly during the recent market turmoil, 
as can be seen in ﬁ  gure 1, Prior to the on-
set of the crisis, the average ARS rate was 
about 175 basis points below the Libor. 
Once the turmoil started, this pattern re-
versed. The rates converged on January 9, 
2008, and subsequently the average ARS 
rate exceeded the Libor—a historical 
anomaly. In the course of the turmoil, the 
Libor fell by about 300 basis points as the 
U.S. Federal Reserve eased monetary 
1. SIFMA ARS Index vs. Libor
NOTES: SIFMA ARS Index means the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association’s Auction Rate Securities Index, and Libor means the London interbank 
offered rate. The horizontal axis is in calendar months.
SOURCES: Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and Haver Analytics.
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2008 2007policy, while the average ARS rate rose 
by about 200 basis points. The ARS rate 
peaked in mid-March around the time 
of the near collapse of investment bank 
Bear Stearns. While this rate fell some-
what thereafter, as of mid-August, the 
ARS rate was still about 80 basis points 
above the Libor, a very large spread by 
historical standards.
The rash of failed auctions in the ARS 
markets starting in February 2008 has 
prompted issuers to consider a variety of 
potential solutions, including: ﬁ  nding 
buyers for ARSs in the secondary market;7 
converting ARSs to variable-rate demand 
notes; and replacing ARSs with short-
term debt funding. These efforts have 
met with limited success. In addition, 
some closed-end mutual funds with ARS 
liabilities sold other fund assets to raise 
money for auction rate redemptions. As 
the number of failed auctions rose, the 
value of these securities fell, with many 
dealers marking down the value of these 
securities on client statements by amounts 
ranging from 10% to 50% over the past 
few months. 
The failure of the ARS market has af-
fected many different sectors of the 
economy. In particular, it has put addi-
tional pressure on the already stressed 
municipal bond market. In addition, 
ARSs were a preferred funding vehicle 
for many state student loan organizations. 
The collapse of this market has limited 
the amount of loans available for the 
coming school year.
Legal developments
Even before the recent ﬁ  nancial turmoil, 
practices in the ARS market were subject 
to scrutiny from the SEC, which regulates 
securities markets. In May 2006, the 
SEC levied ﬁ  nes of $13 million against 
15 broker–dealers8  for auction practices 
that were not adequately disclosed to in-
vestors, which constituted violations of 
securities laws. Among the violations list-
ed were: 1) interventions in auctions to 
prevent failed auctions without adequate 
disclosure, and 2) illegal allocation of 
securities. In particular, it was charged 
that certain respondents “exercised dis-
cretion in allocating securities to investors 
who bid at the clearing rate instead of 
allocating the securities pro rata as 
stated in the disclosure documents.”9 
Following these actions, SIFMA (the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association) issued a “best practices” doc-
ument.10 The best practices dealt with 
the mechanics of the auction process, 
but also stressed the need to educate 
both issuers and investors about the ma-
terial features of auction rate securities. 
Not surprisingly, the failure of the ARS 
market in February 2008 has increased 
the pace of legal action, mainly lawsuits 
by investors against ARS brokers and 
funds. The main thrust of these lawsuits 
is that “broker–dealers and issuers 
materially misrepresented the liquidity 
and risks of the auction rate securities 
to individual investors and corporations 
by labeling these securities as ‘cash 
equivalents,’ in press releases, monthly 
account statements, individual commu-
nications with investors, and other in-
vestment guidance material.”11 
In addition many state securities regula-
tors and state attorneys general have ﬁ  led 
civil fraud charges against ARS dealers. 
These investigations involve allegations 
that dealers were misrepresenting ARSs 
as cash-equivalent securities and failed to 
disclose the risks associated with poten-
tial auction failure. For example, the 
attorney general of New York charged 
investment bank UBS with “falsely selling 
and marketing auction rate securities as 
safe, highly liquid, and cash-equivalent 
securities.”12 As a result of these investi-
gations, some ﬁ  rms have been subjected 
to ﬁ  nes and have agreed to buy back the 
securities from investors at par value. 
Speciﬁ  cally, starting in early August 2008, 
UBS, Citigroup, JPMorgan Chase, 
Morgan Stanley, Wachovia, and Merrill 
Lynch, among others, have announced 
agreements to pay ﬁ  nes and buy back 
a total of $56 billion of these securities. 
In addition, the State of Massachusetts 
announced settlements in mid-August 
with UBS and Merrill Lynch. A number 
of other investigations by various state 
and national entities, including the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
and the attorneys general of Mississippi 
and Alabama, are ongoing.
Conclusion 
Auction rate securities represented an 
ingenious attempt to square a particular 
ﬁ  nancial circle: to create a funding in-
strument that appears long term from 
the borrower’s perspective but short 
term from the lender’s perspective. We 
now see what should have been obvious 
before: Such an arrangement is impos-
sible. If a funding instrument is long 
term for one party, it also must be long 
term for the counterparty; any appear-
ance to the contrary must be an illusion. 
The collapse of the ARS market is but 
one example of how the recent liquidity 
crisis in our ﬁ  nancial markets has ad-
versely affected all arrangements that 
funded long-term investments with 
short-duration liabilities. Because such 
arrangements are inherently unstable, 
their failure can cause great discom-
fort for borrowers or lenders or both.
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By February 2008, fears of auction failure became self-fulﬁ  lling as 
potential investors withdrew from the auction rate securities market.1 A Texas law ﬁ  rm even started a website 
(www.auctionratesecuritieslawsuit.com) 
in an effort to ﬁ  nd potential plaintiffs.
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